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Abstract
We analyze competition between vertically-integrated operators who build infrastructure
and provide access in diﬀerent geographical areas. Under full commitment, the regulator sets
socially-optimal access rates that depend on the local degree of infrastructure competition. If
he can only commit to implementing a single access price, the regulator can impose a uniform
access price or deregulate access in competitive areas. While uniform access pricing leads to
suboptimal investment, deregulation can spur investment. Still, deregulation is not an ideal
solution to the commitment problem, as it tends to involve multiple and ineﬃcient equilibria at
the wholesale level, with either too little or too much investment.
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1 Introduction
Investment in broadband infrastructure is drawing extraordinary attention from governments and
regulators all over the world, due to the significant impact of high-speed access networks on economic
growth (Czernich et al., 2011). While regulatory intervention must create conditions that encourage
(or rather, do not discourage) infrastructure investment, it should at the same time prevent the
monopolization of the retail market for high-speed broadband services. The latter calls for some
form of regulated access to infrastructures, while the former implies that this should be done with
care.
An added complication is that competition among high-speed broadband networks is likely to
emerge only in specific regions of a country, mostly in very dense metropolitan areas, while in the
rest of the country infrastructure competition will probably not materialize. For the least densely
populated areas, only government subsidies will make private investment viable. But even in areas
covered without the need for public subsidies, the number of operators rolling out their network
will diﬀer. Large swathes of the country will most likely be left with only one high-speed network,
while urban areas might be covered by two or more. From a regulatory point of view, this calls
for ex-ante access rules to vary across areas characterized by diﬀerent degrees of infrastructure
competition. While this is plausible from the point of view of competition law now popular in
telecommunications regulation, there is a lack of theoretical research on this type of access regime
and its impact on firms’ investment decisions. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap.
Our paper is motivated by recent decisions by the European Commission that forcefully push
for the adoption of geographically diﬀerentiated remedies, or "geographical access rules" as they
are referred to by policy makers (see e.g. ERG, 2008).1 The 2009/140/EC Directive ("Better Regu-
1The association of European Telecom Regulators (ERG, 2008) provides a list of criteria to assess the homogeneity
of competitive conditions in diﬀerent geographical markets and to define geographical access remedies. Xavier and
Ypsilanti (2011) analyze the practical complexity of geographically segmented regulation.
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lation Directive") explicitly considers the possibility of defining diﬀerent geographical markets and
remedies according to prevailing competitive conditions.2 This approach was recently confirmed in
the EU Recommendation C(2010) 6223 on "Regulated Access to Next Generation Access Networks
(NGANs)" (September 2010), with Recital 10 stating that "the transition from copper-based to
fibre-based networks may change the conditions of competition in diﬀerent geographic areas and
may necessitate a review of the geographical scope of markets and remedies [...]" (emphasis added).
The European legislator thus invites national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to examine diﬀerences
in the degree of infrastructure competition across geographical areas, in order to determine whether
the definition of subnational geographical markets or the imposition of diﬀerentiated remedies are
warranted.3
This paper’s main focus is on how regulators should account for geographical diﬀerences in their
access pricing policies. We therefore study the impact of the geographical structure of regulation
on firms’ investment incentives and static welfare.
Our model is structured as follows. In a country composed of a continuum of areas with an
increasing cost of coverage, two incumbent operators decide to deploy their own networks where
investment can be recouped by retail profits. Two types of areas can emerge: Single infrastructure
areas where only one incumbent has invested, and duplicate infrastructure areas where both in-
cumbents have rolled out a network. We assume that the incumbent operators must provide access
to a third operator and to each other. However, access regimes can diﬀer between areas depending
on the diﬀering degrees of infrastructure competition.
2Recital 7 of the Directive states: "In order to ensure a proportionate and adaptable approach to varying compet-
itive conditions, national regulatory authorities should be able to define markets on a subnational basis and to lift
regulatory obligations in markets and/or geographic areas where there is eﬀective infrastructure competition."
3For current broadband services, national regulators in the UK (Ofcom, 2007) and Portugal (Anacom, 2009)
have already made the decision to divide the wholesale broadband market into diﬀerent sub-markets according to
diﬀerences in competitive conditions, and have proposed the adoption of diﬀerentiated wholesale remedies in diﬀerent
(competitive and non-competitive) areas. Similar decisions were recently taken by the Finnish and Hungarian NRAs
(see the EC decision FI/2009/900 for Finland and HU/2007/0662-663 for Hungary).
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Regulatory commitment has a strong impact on investment incentives. If the regulator faces
no commitment or information problem, he can implement duplication-based remedies, that is, set
diﬀerentiated access prices in both the single and the duplicate infrastructure areas. However, the
regulator may face an informational problem (for example, he may be unable to collect enough
information to compute diﬀerentiated access charges) and/or a commitment problem. If unable
to commit at all, the regulator will set access charges in both areas at marginal cost, which is a
standard finding in the literature.4 In this case, we show that as a result only one infrastructure
will be deployed in equilibrium and no duplication will occur. However, this outcome is socially
undesirable if duplication entails benefits in terms of higher variety or quality.
We then consider the more realistic possibility that the regulator can at least "partially" com-
mit, in that he can commit to a single access price. Under this constraint, a standard solution that
regulators have adopted is to implement a uniform access price, which naturally tends to produce
a suboptimal outcome. Alternatively, regulators can diﬀerentiate regulation according to the avail-
ability of multiple facilities by setting the access price in single infrastructure areas, and leaving
it "to the market" in duplicate infrastructure areas. We show that in this regulatory framework,
contrary to what one might hope, market outcomes may be neither easily predictable nor eﬃcient.
First, the wholesale game between access providers has a natural tendency towards multiple equi-
libria. Second, none of the resulting equilibria are eﬃcient when investment incentives are factored
in: Either competition results in very low access prices which destroy investment incentives, or
competition does not take oﬀ and access and retail prices remain high. In sum, we show that
partial deregulation of access conditions does not solve the commitment problem, since it may
create problems of its own and investment remains suboptimal even in the presence of wholesale
competition.
4See, for example, Besanko and Spulber (1992).
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Literature Review. Our paper merges two diﬀerent strands of the literature. The first deals
with universal service obligations (USOs), uniform pricing constraints and coverage, while the
second deals with the interaction between access regulation and investment.
In the USO literature, most papers focus on the role of uniform pricing constraints and their im-
pact on network coverage and market competition. Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002) show that
the introduction of uniform pricing and coverage constraints is not competitively neutral: Under
uniform pricing, the equilibrium coverage may be lower than without any regulatory intervention.
Similar results for the strategic links created through pricing restrictions have been found by Anton
et al. (2002), Choné et al. (2000, 2002) and Foros and Kind (2003). Hoernig (2006) concentrates
his analysis on the imposition of uniform pricing constraints and shows that the opening of the
market to competition in the presence of uniform pricing constraints on all operators gives rise to
a series of neighboring monopolies rather than competition for customers. All these papers focus
on the impact of uniform pricing constraints at retail level on market coverage and competition.
However, they do not address the possibility of geographical diﬀerentiation in broadband coverage,
and they completely neglect the problem of uniform and non-uniform (i.e., geographically diﬀeren-
tiated) wholesale rules on investment incentives and their impact on market competition and firms’
investment, which is the focus of our paper.
The second strand of literature analyzes the impact of access regulation on firms’ investment.
Cambini and Jiang (2009) provide a recent and comprehensive review of both theoretical and
empirical papers on broadband investment and regulation. Some studies analyze the incumbent’s
investment incentives (Foros, 2004; Katakorpi, 2006; Brito et al., 2010; Nitsche and Wiethaus,
2011; Mizuno and Yoshino, 2012) or the alternative operators’ (Bourreau and Dog˘an, 2006) as
a function of the access regime. Several other papers (Gans, 2001 and 2007; Hori and Mizuno,
2006; Vareda and Hoernig, 2010) study the impact of access charges in a dynamic investment race
5
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between the incumbent and the entrants. Finally, additional papers have recently focused on the
interplay between access regulation and the migration from the old legacy network to an NGAN
infrastructure (Bourreau, Cambini and Dog˘an, 2012; Brito, Pereira and Vareda, 2012; Inderst and
Peitz, 2012). All the above papers address the problem of investment in broadband infrastructures
and access regulation in diﬀerent ways. However, none of them specifically look at the introduction
of geographically diﬀerentiated access rules and the impact of geographical access remedies on
market competition and firms’ investment, which is the topic of this paper.
Finally, our paper analyzes the impact of the regulator’s commitment power on investment.
Most papers assume either full commitment from the regulator (e.g., Vareda and Hoernig, 2010;
Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011) or no commitment (e.g., Foros, 2004; Katakorpi, 2006). One exception
is Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010), who analyze the two polar cases of no commitment and
full commitment. We extend their analysis by considering also the intermediate case of partial
commitment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model setup. In Section 3 we
analyze the regulator’s choice of geographically diﬀerentiated access prices under full commitment.
We also discuss the commitment issue and consider the alternative of uniform access charges when
the regulator can only partially commit. In Section 4 we analyze the impact of competition-based
access charges on investment incentives under partial commitment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
All longer proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model Setup
Two incumbent network operators (firms 1 and 2) invest in coverage of next generation access
infrastructures, and an entrant (firm e) can ask for access but does not invest. The incumbent
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operators build infrastructures in diﬀerent areas [0, z] of a country, where z is large enough so that
some areas remain uncovered in equilibrium.
Cost structure. In our model we want to capture the typical cost structure of next-generation
access networks. Whereas the marginal cost of running the network is independent of a customer’s
location, the fixed cost of linking up each customer does depend on their location. To be more
precise, it is cheapest to connect a customer in densely populated areas such as urban centres, and
most costly in outlying rural areas. We therefore assume that the fixed cost of coverage c(z) is
strictly increasing with the area z, from c(0) = 0. We assume that firms i = 1, 2 build networks
that cover the contiguous areas [0, zi], with zi ≤ z, with total investment cost
C(zi) =
zi
0
c(x)dx.
We have C (zi) = c(zi) and C (zi) = c(zi) > 0, and we assume that incumbent firms face the same
investment cost function. Finally, we assume that all firms have the same marginal (wholesale and
retail) costs in all areas, which we normalize to zero.5
Access and retail competition. According to the incumbents’ investment decisions, two types
of areas can emerge: single infrastructure areas (SIAs), where only one incumbent has invested, and
duplicate infrastructure areas (DIAs), where both incumbents have rolled out a network.6 Contrary
to papers like Valletti et al. (2002) and Hoernig (2006), we assume that firms can set a diﬀerent
retail price in each area, depending on competitive conditions. Hence, they obtain diﬀerent profits
5Our modeling assumptions for the cost structure are in line with Valletti et al. (2002), for example, who assume
zero marginal production costs, and that the fixed investment cost increases over areas. By contrast, Hoernig (2006)
assumes an increasing marginal cost and a constant fixed investment cost. Assuming increasing marginal costs in our
setting would complexify the analysis. However, since the profitability of investing in a given area would decrease
over areas, we would still obtain duplicate and single infrastructure areas, and the rest of our analysis would be
qualitatively similar.
6There are also, of course, areas with no infrastructure.
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in DIAs and SIAs.7
We also assume that the regulator imposes an access obligation on incumbent firms’ infrastruc-
tures, which allows firm e to enter the market and network owners to use each others’ networks.
We denote by a and a the access charges in DIAs and SIAs, respectively.8,9 The possibility of access
aﬀects the outcome as follows. First, in duplicate infrastructure areas (DIAs) only one network
provides access, introducing an additional source of asymmetry between incumbents. Second, in
single infrastructure areas (SIAs), the incumbent provides access to both the entrant and the rival
incumbent. Note that there may be a diﬀerent wholesale provider in DIAs and SIAs.
We denote by π(j)i (a) and π
(j)
i (a) the per-DIA and per-SIA profit of firm i = 1, 2, e when
firm j = 1, 2 is the wholesale provider (including all retail and wholesale revenues, but gross of
investment cost). In SIAs, the access provider makes more profit than access seekers if a > 0,
due to the higher perceived marginal cost of its competitors. In DIAs, if both incumbents oﬀer
the same access price a, the entrant randomly chooses an access provider,10 hence the (ex ante)
expected per-DIA profit of infrastructure owner i = 1, 2 is πd(a) = (π(i)i (a) + π
(j)
i (a))/2, where
j = 1, 2 and j 
= i. All profits are continuous functions of access charges, and in the following we
drop the arguments for clarity whenever possible.
We make the following assumptions on the relation between profits and access charges.11 First,
we assume that access seekers’ profits are strictly decreasing in the access charges, and that there
are unique access charge levels ae, ae > 0 such that π(j)e (ae) = π(j)e (ae) = 0, that is, the entrant
7 In some countries (e.g., Portugal), broadband operators oﬀer discounts on the catalogue price which vary according
to geographical areas. In many countries, operators also oﬀer diﬀerent qualities of service (e.g., bandwidth) according
to geography, corresponding to diﬀerent quality-adjusted prices.
8Throughout the paper, we use a tilde () on a variable to indicate that it relates to SIAs.
9Access charges can diﬀer between DIAs and SIAs, but not between infrastructure operators within the same type
of area. In other words, we do not discuss here the adoption of asymmetric rules across infrastructure operators.
10 If the entrant is indiﬀerent between two access oﬀers for a given regulated access price, we assume that it chooses
only one access provider in each type of area, e.g., due to transaction costs. An alternative assumption would be
that the access seeker commits ex ante to using a specific network when two are present. This will not change total
coverage if duplication is partial.
11 In the working paper version (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012), we provide an illustrative model which
satisfies these (standard) assumptions.
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just breaks even.
Second, the access provider’s (ex post) profits in DIAs and SIAs are maximized, subject to the
constraint that the entrant is viable, at am = argmaxa≤ae π
(i)
i (a) and am = argmaxa≤ae π
(i)
i (a),
respectively. No individual access provider would voluntarily set a higher access charge. On the
other hand, we assume that in DIAs the rival infrastructure firm’s profits π(j)i (a) are increasing in
a, e.g., because retail prices are strategic complements. As a result, ad = argmaxa≤ae πd(a) is at
least as high as am, and πd(a) strictly increases in a for a ∈

0, ad

.
Access charges higher than ad and am would simultaneously lead to lower expected profits
for network owners and lower welfare. In other words, they would reduce coverage without any
compensating welfare gains, as we will see later.12 A benevolent regulator will therefore only select
a ≤ ad and a ≤ am, which we will assume for the rest of the paper.
Welfare. Finally, we denote by w(a) and w(a) the social welfare in DIAs and SIAs, respectively,
gross of investment costs, where welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and profits. In
our setting, duplication of infrastructure entails two potential social benefits. First, it may have a
direct eﬀect on welfare, by bringing about a higher variety or quality of service. Second, duplication
has a competitive (indirect) eﬀect: Because the perceived marginal cost of an incumbent firm that
duplicates infrastructure decreases,13 competition becomes more intense, causing retail prices to
decline. We therefore assume that w(a) > w(a) for all a ≥ 0.
12While entry is unprofitable if a > ae and a > ae, unregulated networks would foreclose entry if and only if the
maximal profit they can make under access is less than the profit they obtain without providing access. Depending
on the demand-expanding eﬀect of entry, this may or may not be the case.
13 Its marginal cost goes down from a–since it was leasing access to its rival in SIAs–to 0, since it now uses its
own infrastructure at marginal cost (i.e. 0, due to our normalization).
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3 Duplication-Based Remedies under Full Commitment
In this section we assume that the regulator does not face any informational or commitment prob-
lem. In this case, given the presence of areas with diﬀerent degrees of infrastructure competition, it
is possible to set diﬀerent access prices in single and duplicate infrastructure areas. In other words,
the regulator can implement what we call duplication-based remedies.14
Thus, under full commitment the timing of the game is as follows. First, the regulator sets the
access charges a and a for DIAs and SIAs, respectively. Second, firms 1 and 2 non-cooperatively
decide on coverage. Third, all firms decide whether to ask for access in DIAs and SIAs. Fourth,
firms compete for consumers and profits are realized. We consider subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
in pure strategies. We will discuss and relax the hypothesis of full commitment at the end of the
section.
Access and investment. At Stage 3, firms can ask for access in areas where an infrastructure
has been rolled out. In DIAs, firm e randomly chooses an access provider, while firms i = 1, 2 are
(at least weakly) better oﬀ using their own infrastructure than asking for access. In SIAs, where
firm i = 1 or i = 2 has invested, firms j 
= i ask for access; this is always optimal for them, since
the assumption is that each access seeker obtains positive profits.
At Stage 2, each incumbent firm i = 1, 2 chooses a coverage [0, zi] so as to maximize its profit,
given its rival’s coverage [0, zj ], with j = 1, 2, j 
= i. If firm i chooses zi > zj , it will be the access
provider in the SIAs (zj , zi]. However, in the DIAs [0, zj ] either firm i or firm j can be the access
14 In the (unrealistic) case where the social planner would be able to set a diﬀerent access charge in every single
area, he could achieve higher total welfare, as analyzed in our working paper (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012).
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provider, with expected per-area profits πd(a). Firm i’s expected total profit is then
Πi(zi, zj) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ziπ
d(a) + (zj − zi) π(j)i (a)− C(zi) if zi ≤ zj ,
zjπ
d(a) + (zi − zj) π(i)i (a)− C(zi) if zi > zj .
This profit function highlights the incumbent’s trade-oﬀs with regard to the coverage decision.
For small zj , firm i chooses its coverage trading oﬀ the marginal profits derived from being an
access provider in SIAs, π(i)i (a), and the cost of covering an additional marginal area alone. If zj
is large, on the other hand, firm i trades oﬀ the profit it obtains from remaining an access seeker
in its marginal area, π(j)i (a), with the gains derived from becoming an infrastructure owner, i.e.
πd(a) less the investment cost. Thus, access creates an additional opportunity cost for investment,
consisting of the profits obtained after asking for access.
The following result characterizes the coverage equilibrium at Stage 2 and shows how the DIA
and SIA coverage limits, zd and z˜s, respectively, vary with the access charges.15
Lemma 1 Define the coverage limits zd and zs by c(zd) ≡ πd(a)−π(j)i (a) and c(zs) ≡ π
(i)
i (a). The
equilibria of the coverage subgame are as follows:
• If a is small, then zd < zs and there is Partial Duplication: one incumbent firm covers the
areas [0, zs], while the other firm duplicates in the areas

0, zd

. There is No Duplication,
i.e. zd = 0, if and only if a = a = 0.
• Otherwise, if a is larger, there is Full Duplication: both incumbent firms cover the areas

0, zfd

, where zfd ∈

zs, zd

.
15Since we model coverage strategies as intervals of areas starting from zero, equilibria where both infrastructure
firms act as monopoly providers in diﬀerent areas cannot emerge. This type of equilibria would arise if firms could
decide whether or not to deploy a network separately in each (infinitesimal) area. Since this leads to a multiplicity
of equilibria and complexifies the analysis, without necessarily being more realistic (since in practice firms tend to
cover contiguous areas), we restrict the game to simpler coverage strategies.
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The coverage limits zd and zs increase strictly in a ∈

0, ad

and a ∈ [0,am].
Proof. See Appendix A, where we also state the exact limits on a.
While the coverage limits in DIAs and SIAs, zd and zs, are functions of the access charges, in
the rest of the paper we mostly drop these arguments for the sake of clarity.
We now provide intuitions regarding the diﬀerent outcomes. No duplication occurs when be-
coming a potential access provider is highly unattractive, which happens precisely when both access
charges are very low. A DIA or SIA access charge at cost reduces returns on investment, while a
SIA access charge at cost also increases the opportunity cost of duplicating rather than being an ac-
cess seeker. With regard to social welfare, while with cost-based access the competition-enhancing
eﬀect of network duplication disappears, there is still a welfare loss from the absence of duplication,
in terms of lower variety and/or quality of service.
For small though positive values of the DIA access charge a, duplication occurs in the cheapest
areas, while only one infrastructure is rolled out in the more costly areas. In this case, the SIA
and DIA access charges are high enough so that being an access provider is attractive, while at the
same time the DIA access charge is too low to be an incentive for full duplication.
At the other extreme, with a very high DIA access charge, we obtain multiple equilibria which
all involve full duplication, but with diﬀerent coverage levels. The existence of multiple equilibria
is due to a coordination failure between investors. Both firms would actually prefer full duplication
up to zd, but if one firm covers less, the other investor will not find it profitable to extend coverage
any further on its own.
The case of full duplication involves an interesting additional issue. While the boundaries of the
equilibrium region change with access charges, any interior equilibrium point remains unaﬀected by
small changes in the access charges. Together with the fact that these equilibria are Pareto-ranked
in the sense that among them a joint coverage of all areas up to zd leads to the highest welfare
12
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and profits, this suggests an additional potential role for the regulator. This role would consist in
helping firms to coordinate on the "right" equilibrium, while ensuring that coverage responds to
the announced access charges.
The above Lemma also implies that SIA and DIA coverage increase in both access charges. This
implies that the regulator faces the usual dilemma between setting lower access charges to maximize
per-area welfare and setting higher access charges to maximize (or duplicate) coverage.16 There
is another subtler issue, however, which is that in DIAs it is necessary to distinguish between the
imposition of a specific value for the access charge (as we have assumed so far) and the imposition
of a cap. This distinction matters whenever the regulator wants to increase coverage through an
access price above am, which is the maximum price that the access provider would like to charge.
If the regulator sets a cap a above am, rather than setting the access price a, the access provider
will choose ex post the access price am < a, which satisfies the cap, and duopoly coverage will not
increase beyond zd(am,a). On the other hand, if an access price a > am is fixed before investments
are made, then the possibility of not being the access provider while benefiting from a high retail
price level raises expected profits and increases coverage.
The regulator’s trade-oﬀ. Higher access charges inflate retail prices and reduce consumption,
hence decreasing per-area welfare. Social benefits from higher coverage therefore need to be traded
oﬀ against social costs in terms of lower welfare per area. Infrastructure competition moreover
reduces one incumbent firm’s perceived marginal cost and contributes additional benefits in terms
of variety or quality of service, meaning that a positive degree of duplication is optimal.
We start by discussing the trade-oﬀs involved when there is partial duplication in the coverage
16Access provision can increase coverage if access charges are high enough and services are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated,
so that entry increases demand and joint profits.
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subgame.17 In this case, total welfare is given by
W = zdw +

zs − zd
	
w − C(zs)− C(zd).
The social benefits of covering a marginal single or duplicated area are
Δs = w − c(zs) = w − π(i)i ,
Δd = w − w − c(zd) = w − πd − ( w − π(j)i ),
respectively. Both expressions contain the net benefit of investment, i.e. the welfare gain less the
investment cost, but Δd also includes the social opportunity cost of duplication, which is the social
welfare forgone in a SIA, w. While Δs is always positive, as it is equal to consumer surplus plus
the profits of firms j and e, Δd may be negative for high a and low a. On the other hand, Δd is
positive at a = 0.18
With these definitions, the eﬀect of the access charges on welfare is given by
∂W
∂a
= zd
dw
da  
(-)
+ Δd
∂zd
∂a  
(+) or (-)
, (1)
and
∂W
∂a =

zs − zd
	 d w
da  
(-)
+Δs
dzs
da  
(+)
+ Δd
∂zd
∂a  
(+) or (-)
. (2)
The first terms in equations (1) and (2) are negative and represent the loss in static eﬃciency
due to higher access charges. The other terms represent the variation in welfare due the change
17 In our working paper (Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig, 2012), we show that both full and no duplication lead to
lower social welfare.
18 Indeed, we have w (0) > w(0) from our assumptions, and πd(0) = π(j)i (0).
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in coverage, keeping net per-area welfare fixed (i.e., the benefits or costs in terms of dynamic
eﬃciency). The second term in (2) is positive, indicating that the regulator would always want to
expand total coverage further by increasing a. On the other hand, the last terms in (1) and (2)
have an ambiguous sign. Since they translate the net gain from transforming a SIA into a DIA,
they are positive only if the gain from increased competition and variety outweighs the investment
cost and the opportunity cost of duplication. If not, then the regulator would set both lower a and
a in order to limit duplication.
What is clear, however, is that diﬀerent trade-oﬀs underlie the optimal choice of access charges
in DIAs and SIAs, respectively. Therefore, the resulting optimal access charges aso and a˜so can
only be equal by chance. The following result summarizes this analysis.
Proposition 1 Under full commitment, the regulator optimally sets diﬀerent access charges aso
in DIAs and a˜so in SIAs, taking into account the relevant trade-oﬀs between static and dynamic
eﬃciency.
While the above trade-oﬀs do not allow us to make a clear-cut statement about the relative
sizes of access charges, the fact that the access provision in SIAs limits the feasibility of duplication
indicates that it should be optimal to set a relatively high access charge in SIAs and a relatively
lower one in DIAs.19
The commitment issue. So far, we have assumed that the regulator can commit to an ac-
cess scheme with diﬀerent access prices for DIAs and SIAs, and evaluate the resulting trade-oﬀs.
However, the regulator may be unable to implement sophisticated duplication-based remedies, for
diﬀerent reasons.
19 In our working paper we present a simulation of the optimal duplication-based access charges in an example and
confirm that a will be low and a will be high(er).
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First, the regulator might face informational constraints and be unable to gather enough infor-
mation to diﬀerentiate the access charges according to geography and market structure. Second,
he may be unable to commit to the access regime ex ante. The literature on access and investment
acknowledges the problem of the regulator’s commitment. For example, Foros (2004) assumes that
regulatory commitment is not possible, similarly to Brito et al. (2010), who show that the adop-
tion of a two-part access tariﬀ partially mitigates this problem. The same assumption is made by
Mizuno and Yoshino (2012).
If the regulator is unable to commit at all, then once investments have been made, he sets the
access charge to marginal cost in all areas (i.e., to zero in our setting, in line with the normalization
that we defined). Based on Lemma 1, cost-based access pricing implies that no duplication takes
place. As we explained above, there is no duplication because an infrastructure firm can obtain the
same retail revenues with or without investing into a network. However, an absence of duplication
is not socially optimal because of the lost benefits in terms of variety and/or quality of service.
Even though the regulator may be unable to commit to a sophisticated access rule, he may be
able to commit to a simpler rule, with a single (linear) access price, as this is standard in regulatory
practice. However, we make the assumption that this access price may apply to all or only some
areas. We refer to this limited commitment as a "partial commitment". Lack of information can
moreover force the regulator to set a single access price. For example, ERG (2008) argues that
defining diﬀerent geographical markets does not imply the need to adopt diﬀerentiated remedies if
this might generate excessively complex regulatory intervention.
One standard solution adopted by many regulators is to set a uniform access price for all
geographical areas. However, the above discussion clearly shows that uniform access pricing is not
likely to be socially optimal, and we can therefore state the following result:
Corollary 1 Uniform access pricing leads to lower welfare than duplication-based access pricing.
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Note that the point of this corollary is not that having two instruments–in this case two access
prices–is necessarily better than having just one (though it most likely is). The important issue
here is that the trade-oﬀs involved in setting the two access prices are diﬀerent, and that their
optimal values will therefore diﬀer.
4 Competition-Based Remedies and Partial Commitment
We now consider an alternative regulatory regime which has been proposed by regulators (see for
instance Ofcom, 2007), and which we call competition-based remedies. More precisely, we assume
that the regulator can only partially commit. As a result, he sets the access charge in the SIAs,
but does not regulate the wholesale market in the "competitive" areas (i.e., the DIAs). In DIAs
incumbents can therefore set the access charge to their networks on a commercial basis. However,
without any regulatory intervention the presence of wholesale competition might lead to market
foreclosure (Ordover and Shaﬀer, 2007; Bourreau et al., 2011). Consequently, the only assumption
that we make–in line with the existing regulatory framework (Directive 2009/140/EC)–is that
the entrant should not be foreclosed; if that happens, the regulator will intervene as detailed below.
Though competition-based remedies might seem to be a good alternative to uniform pricing
under partial commitment, in what follows we show that the resulting outcomes are not that
simple due to a potential multiplicity of equilibria in the wholesale market (already identified in
the literature),20 and to the fact that these equilibria tend to have unattractive properties: They
either lead to an absence of duplication or to an excessively high access price.
More precisely, we consider diﬀerentiated remedies where the regulator implements a light
20See Bourreau et al. (2011). Ordover and Saloner (2007) do not obtain multiple equilibria in a model of wholesale
market competition similar to Bourreau et al., because they allow for full foreclosure and, under the parameter
restrictions they impose, only the perfectly competitive equilibrium exists. With two vertically-integrated firms,
one of which is the exogenously given wholesale provider, Höﬄer and Schmidt (2008) also show that introducing
service-based competition can lead to higher retail prices, due to the softening eﬀect.
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regulatory approach in DIAs. Infrastructure owners can freely make private access oﬀers to the
entrant. The regulator will take action only if there is no viable access oﬀer, in which case he
imposes access at a dispute resolution price adr ≤ ae.
Foreseeing the resulting market outcome, the regulator also sets the SIA access charge in order
to maximize total welfare. Note however that given the multiplicity of equilibria that emerge in the
wholesale market, the regulator can only imperfectly anticipate the equilibrium that will emerge
in competitive areas. The regulator therefore cannot know ex ante whether the SIA access charge
he sets will be optimal ex post. This implies that deregulating access in competitive infrastructure
areas generates an additional source of ineﬃciency: The access charge set by the regulator in SIAs
is unlikely to be socially optimal ex post. We will come back on this point below.
We modify the timing of the game as follows. In the first stage, the regulator sets the SIA access
price and the dispute resolution price adr. In the second stage, firms 1 and 2 decide on coverage. In
the third stage, firms 1 and 2 make their DIA access oﬀers a1, a2 ∈ [0,∞],21 and then the regulator
imposes ai = adr if min{a1, a2} > ae. Firms subsequently decide whether to ask for access in any
given area. Finally, in the fourth stage they compete for consumers.
Again, we proceed by backward induction. The equilibrium at the retail competition stage is
the same as above, given access prices a˜ and a, where a = min{a1, a2}. We now consider access
decisions at Stage 3. In SIAs, where only firm i has invested, firm j 
= i and firm e ask for access at
the regulated access price a. In DIAs, on the other hand, the entrant chooses the incumbent with
lower access price ai or selects one firm randomly if a1 = a2.
We now determine the incumbent networks’ choice of the DIA access charges ai at Stage 2.
As shown by Bourreau et al. (2011), more than one equilibrium outcome may exist. As one
might expect, competitive bidding for access could ensue, with a resulting equilibrium at marginal
21Setting the access price to infinity is tantamount to not making an access oﬀer.
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cost. On the other hand, access provision changes strategic behavior in the retail market: The
access-providing incumbent becomes a less aggressive competitor, since a high access price makes it
unattractive to compete for retail customers. This corresponds to the "fat-cat eﬀect" (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1984) or "softening eﬀect" (Bourreau et al., 2011). Thus, the access provider will
set a high retail price and rely mostly on wholesale profits. As a result, the owner of the other
infrastructure feels little retail pricing pressure and may obtain higher retail profits than the access
provider himself.
More precisely, we assume that π(i)j (0) = π
(i)
i (0), and that there exists an access charge a
∗ > 0
such that π(i)j (a
∗) = π
(i)
i (a
∗) and π(i)j (a) > π
(i)
i (a) if and only if a > a
∗. For access charges above
a∗ each infrastructure firm prefers its rival to oﬀer access, in which case competition for providing
access may not arise. On the other hand, if access charges are below a∗ then each firm prefers to be
the access provider. The structure of the equilibria depends on whether a∗ lies above or below the
profit-maximizing access charge am. In an example with a linear demand system with diﬀerentiation
à la Shubik and Levitan, Bourreau et al. (2011) show that a∗ lies below am if services are suﬃciently
homogeneous. With more homogeneous goods, the relative gains from weaker competition due to
a high access charge are greater than the losses due to fewer wholesale customers.22
Furthermore, the regulator’s dispute resolution procedure also has surprising eﬀects on potential
equilibria. Depending on the level of the dispute resolution price additional equilibria can arise, as
summed up in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 All wholesale pricing equilibria are given by the following:
1. a "competitive equilibrium", i.e. cost-based access at a1 = a2 = 0;
2. a "dispute-resolution equilibrium" without feasible access oﬀers, if the dispute resolution price
22Using the same demand model, Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012) show that a∗ is always below the fore-
closure access level, ae. In what follows we assume that a∗ < ae.
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is high, i.e. πd(adr) ≥ π(i)i (am);
3. equal and high access prices, i.e. a1 = a2 = a∗, if a∗ ≤ am;
4. only one feasible but high access oﬀer, i.e. ai = am and aj ≥ ae, if a∗ ≤ am and the dispute
resolution price is low (i.e., πd(adr) ≤ π(i)i (am)).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Before discussing the economic consequences of this bewildering set of equilibria we explain why
each equilibrium arises.
The intuitive explanation for the cost-based equilibrium is the rent equalization result of Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1985). Any access price below a∗ can be profitably underbid, and the ensuing
"race to the bottom" stops only when the profits of the access provider and its rival are equal, i.e.
at a = 0 (see Figures 1 and 2). This equilibrium is unique when a∗ > am and the dispute-resolution
price is low (Figure 1). On the other hand, when a∗ < am (Figure 2), there is a second symmetric
equilibrium at a∗. This equilibrium also follows from rent equalization: At this access charge,
infrastructure owners are indiﬀerent between being the access provider or not, and therefore have
no reason to underbid or set a higher access price in order to avoid being chosen.
The eﬀects of the dispute resolution access charge adr may be the least expected. If it is high,
then incumbents may not find it worthwhile to make feasible access oﬀers at all. Rather, they may
wait for the regulator to impose access and hope that their rival will subsequently be chosen by
the entrant. In this case, the equilibrium outcome is the same as if the DIA access price had been
fixed at adr.
On the other hand, for low values of the dispute resolution price adr (i.e., for πd(adr) ≤ π(i)i (am))
and if a∗ < am, an additional equilibrium arises where one firm oﬀers the monopoly access charge
and the other firm refrains from making any feasible oﬀer. Thus, a low dispute resolution price
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Figure 1: Profits in duplicated infrastructure areas for a∗ > am.
Figure 2: Profits in duplicated infrastructure areas for a∗ < am.
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can lead to an access market outcome at the monopoly price am, rather than inducing firms to
necessarily settle for a low access price. This is because the firm that does not serve the wholesale
market benefits from the "softening eﬀect," and makes higher profits than if it undercuts the existing
access price and becomes the access provider. Meanwhile, the access provider’s profit is maximized
at am, as not making a viable access oﬀer is ruled out by the low dispute resolution price.
While the outcomes of the wholesale pricing game do not depend on the SIA access charge,
investments at Stage 2 will depend both on the latter and on the value of the DIA access charge
resulting from the wholesale market equilibrium. For each given outcome, investments will then
follow from the analysis in the last section, with the additional complication that there may po-
tentially be multiple equilibria in the wholesale market, and firms do not know which equilibrium
will be played when they make their investment decisions. The latter adds an element of highly
undesirable "Knightian uncertainty" to investment decisions.
Finally, we turn to the question of whether and how the regulator can achieve the optimal
duplication-based outcome under wholesale competition in DIAs. In short, the answer is "yes" in
some cases, but mostly "no" unless he uses further instruments. The following regulatory measures
are not meant as practical proposals. Rather, our intention is to highlight the kind of (potentially
diﬃcult) intervention that would be necessary to achieve an outcome comparable to duplication-
based remedies.
First, we consider the "competitive" and "dispute resolution" equilibria. These equilibria have
in common that they can be achieved for a continuum of parameter combinations: the first one since
it is a corner solution, and the second one because the regulator can adjust the dispute resolution
price. Recall from Section 3 that aso is the socially optimal DIA access charge when the regulator
sets diﬀerentiated access charges.
Proposition 2 Apart from knife-edge outcomes, the equilibrium under light regulation corresponds
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to the optimal outcome under duplication-based remedies only if either i) aso = 0, or ii) πd(aso) ≥
π
(i)
i (a
m) and the regulator sets adr = aso.
Proof. The competitive equilibrium at a = 0 always exists, and aso = 0 occurs for non-trivial set
of parameters since it is a boundary solution. The dispute resolution equilibrium exists whenever
πd(adr) ≥ π(i)i (am), and the regulator can choose such a value for adr whenever πd(aso) ≥ π
(i)
i (a
m).
The other equilibria, if they exist, are only eﬃcient if, by chance, either aso = a∗ or aso = am.
Evidently, the dispute resolution equilibrium at adr = aso involves the same information and
commitment issues discussed earlier, and therefore does not seem to be very feasible as a regulatory
proposal. If, due to these or other issues, the regulator sets a dispute resolution price close to the
upper limit ae, then the resulting equilibrium will involve excessively high access charges.
On the other hand, if the socially optimal access charge is above a∗, then curiously the social
optimum can only be achieved in this equilibrium where first the firms refuse to grant access and
then the regulator imposes the socially optimal access price. It cannot be achieved with wholesale
prices chosen freely by the market. Note also that the latter equilibrium will always coexist with
the competitive equilibrium, and that the regulator cannot rule wholesale competition driving the
access charge far below a∗.
As concerns the "competitive" equilibrium, in Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2012) we show
in an example that for suﬃciently diﬀerentiated goods the optimal DIA access charge is indeed
zero. Thus, in theory the "competitive" equilibrium can be eﬃcient. On the other hand, with less
diﬀerentiated goods we have aso > 0, and the outcome a = 0 leads to ineﬃciently low duplication
incentives. In this case, the optimal outcome can be achieved only if the regulator has some means
for stopping the competitive process at aso, for example if he can impose a floor access price at
this level.
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To sum up, competition-based wholesale regulation cannot generally achieve the socially optimal
outcome under duplication-based remedies. Whether and how it does, though, depends on the fine
details of consumer demand and on how the (de)regulation is implemented. The informational
requirements and commitment powers for such instruments are essentially the same as those for
duplication-based remedies. It follows that under partial commitment the regulator cannot secure
the necessary incentives for network duplication. Thus, allowing for wholesale competition does
not automatically solve the regulator’s commitment problem nor lead to better market outcomes.
5 Conclusions
One of the recent and hotly debated issues under the new EU regulatory framework–which aims at
fostering investment in new high-speed broadband networks–is the introduction of geographically
diﬀerentiated remedies, that is, diﬀerentiated wholesale access schemes that vary according to the
degree of infrastructure competition in local markets. In this paper we focused on this policy issue
and explicitly considered the possibility for a regulator to impose geographically diﬀerentiated
access remedies, and assessed the impact of alternative regulatory access regimes on investment
incentives.
If the regulator has enough information and faces no commitment problem, he can implement
duplication-based remedies, that is, diﬀerentiated (and socially optimal) access charges in single and
duplicated infrastructure areas. However, he may face informational and/or commitment problems
and not be able to set two diﬀerent access prices. We therefore analyze the market outcomes if
the regulator can commit only partially, by setting a single access price. The standard response to
this constraint, until now adopted by most regulators, is to set a uniform access price. However,
we show that uniform access pricing never achieves the social optimum because it cannot solve
the diﬀerent trade-oﬀs that arise, with respect to coverage vs. static welfare, and duplication vs.
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coverage by a single infrastructure.
An alternative proposal is to set the access price in single infrastructure areas only, while
leaving the access price in duplicate infrastructure areas "to the market". We analyze the resulting
equilibria and show that multiple market outcomes are possible. Furthermore, the intricacies of
wholesale competition imply that equilibrium wholesale prices can be either too high or too low
from a social point of view. Thus, the main finding of our paper is that partial deregulation is not
a miracle solution to the commitment problem and that these more "market-oriented" outcomes
tend not to be socially optimal without further regulatory intervention.
Our framework may be fruitfully extended into diﬀerent directions. Obviously, our setting is
static, hence each operator plays only once and investments are one-shot. A natural extension
might be to introduce some dynamics in investment decisions. This would imply that the size
of competitive and non-competitive areas change over time, calling for a dynamic adjustment of
access remedies. A second, more practical, issue is the implementation of geographical remedies that
might involve additional administrative costs for the regulator due to the continuous adaptation of
wholesale regimes as competitive conditions change over time. We leave these interesting potential
extensions for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Assume that firm j has covered the areas [0, zj ]. Firm i’s profit is then
Πi(zi, zj) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ziπ
d(a) + (zj − zi) π(j)i (a)− C(zi) if zi ≤ zj ,
zjπ
d(a) + (zi − zj) π(i)i (a)− C(zi) if zi > zj .
The interior maximum on the first branch is obtained when the first-order condition holds, that
is, when πd(a) − π(j)i (a) = c(zi). Since πd(0) = π
(j)
i (0) and π
d(a) increases with a, while π(j)i (a)
decreases with a, we have πd(a) ≥ π(j)i (a) for all a ∈ [0, am] and a ∈ [0,am]. We therefore obtain
that zi = zd ≡ c−1(πd(a) − π(j)i (a)). Similarly, the interior maximum on the second branch is
obtained at π(i)i (a) = c(zi), or zi = zs ≡ c−1(π
(i)
i (a)). In both cases the necessary second-order
conditions hold, since −c(zi) ≤ 0. Thus, firm i’s local best responses are min

zj , z
d

on the first
branch, and zs on the second branch.
For πd(a) < π(i)i (a) + π
(j)
i (a), which implies 0 ≤ zd < zs, the global best response to zj ≤ zd
is zi = zs, while the best response to zj ≥ zs is zi = zd. Symmetry then implies that the only
equilibria are

zd, zs

and

zs, zd

. For a = a = 0, we obtain zd = 0 (as πd(0) = π(j)i (0)) and thus
no duplication, while for a > 0 or a > 0 we have πd(a) > π(j)i (a) and thus partial duplication.
On the other hand, for πd(a) ≥ π(i)i (a)+π
(j)
i (a), we have 0 < zs ≤ zd. The global best response
is zs for zj ≤ zs and min

zj , z
d

for zj > zs. Thus, by symmetry, all equilibria are given by any

zfd, zfd

with zfd ∈

zs, zd

, in which case there is full duplication.
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The ranges indicated in the Lemma now follow from the fact that πd is strictly increasing
on [0, am] and therefore has a strictly increasing inverse function, thus zs > zd if and only if
πd(a) < π(i)i (a) + π
(j)
i (a), i.e. if a is small enough. The comparative statics for coverage ranges
follow directly from dπd/da > 0 for all a ∈ [0, am), and dπ(i)i /da > 0 and dπ
(j)
i /da < 0 for all
a ∈ [0,am).
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let us first consider symmetric equilibrium candidates a ∈ [0, ae), where both infrastructure
firms earn πd(a). Any deviation by firm i = 1, 2 to a < a leads to profits π(i)i (a
), while an upwards
deviation to a > a yields π(j)i (a), since the access price that is charged in the latter case is still
a. If π(i)i (a) 
= π
(j)
i (a), then a profitable deviation exists, since π
d(a) is their average. On the other
hand, they are equal if either a = 0 or a = a∗. At a = 0, there are no profitable deviations, thus
a1 = a2 = 0 (i.e., cost-based access) is an equilibrium. At a = a∗, one firm will deviate to am if
and only if a∗ > am. Thus, a1 = a2 = a∗ is an equilibrium too if a∗ ≤ am.
We now consider asymmetric equilibrium candidates 0 ≤ ai < aj < ae, yielding profits π(i)i (ai)
and π(i)j (ai). First, for ai = 0 firm i increases its profits by deviating to some 0 < a < aj . Second,
if 0 < ai < a∗, firm j can increase its profits by underbidding. Third, if ai ≥ a∗, firm i can increase
its profits to π(j)i (aj) by increasing its access price just beyond aj . Thus, there is no asymmetric
equilibrium with aj < ae.
Now, consider asymmetric equilibrium candidates with ai < ae ≤ aj , with profits π(i)i (ai) and
π
(i)
j (ai). The best choice for firm i, if ai < a
e, is then to set ai = am and earn the profits π
(i)
i (a
m),
while for ai ≥ ae the dispute resolution procedure is triggered which leaves firm i with profits
πd(adr). Firms will not deviate from ai = am and aj ≥ ae if π(i)i (am) ≥ πd(adr) and a∗ < am.
Finally, firms not making feasible access oﬀers, i.e. min {ai, aj} ≥ ae, leads to profits πd(adr),
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from which networks will not deviate if and only if πd(adr) ≥ π(i)i (am).
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